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Introduction 
In the run up to the European Parliament (EP) elections of May 2014, one of the most 
prominent questions is how well parties of the populist radical right (PRR) will do and, 
consequently, to what extent mainstream parties will suffer defeats. The financial and 
economic crisis in Europe is generally assumed to have fuelled Eurosceptic sentiments 
and the EP elections are seen to provide an excellent forum for voters to express their 
discontent not only with the process of European integration, but also with political 
establishments more generally. Even though Eurosceptic radical left parties may also 
benefit from a mood of dissatisfaction, most attention seems to focus on the Eurosceptic, 
or Euroreject, parties of the PRR, such as the UK Independence Party, the French Front 
National, and the Dutch Freedom Party.2 In this article we argue that there are indeed 
sufficient reasons to assume that PRR parties, in both Western Europe and post-
communist Central and Eastern countries, will fare well in the EP election. These relate to 
the nature of European elections, developments in public opinion (the political ‘demand 
side’), as well as the presence of credible PRR challengers (the ‘supply side’). It is 
questionable, however, whether the financial and economic crises have also turned 
European integration into a lasting key issue in national political debates and whether the 
PRR’s likely success in the EP elections has predictive value for elections at the national 
level.  
 
European Parliament elections as ‘second order’ elections  
One key reason to suspect that radical parties will perform considerably well in May is 
the, what Reif and Schmitt have called, ‘second order’ character of European Parliament 
elections.3 Following this notion, EP elections are unlike elections at the national level 
because voters feel there is less at stake. Even though many people in Europe may fear 
that ‘Brussels’ – denoting the European Commission, but often also EU institutions more 
                                                          
1 Stijn van Kessel would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for supporting the 
research for this article.    
2 See for instance a recent article in the Economist, ‘Europe’s populist insurgents: Turning right’, 4 
January 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21592666-parties-nationalist-right-are-
changing-terms-european-political-debate-does. 
3 K. Reif and H. Schmitt (1980) ‘Nine Second Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for 
the Analysis of European Election Results’, European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. 
2 
 
generally – is getting too powerful, voters do not attach the same importance to 
European elections as they do to national ones. This has not changed over the years, as 
the ever-falling turnout since the first EP elections in 1979 seems to suggest.4 Where 62 
per cent of the voters in the first elections cast their ballots, the turnout figure in 2009 
sank to 43 per cent. It must be stressed that this trend can partly be explained by the 
extremely low turnout in some of the newer post-communist members states; in 
Slovakia no more than 19.6 per cent of eligible voters turned up, in Lithuania 21 per 
cent, and in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Romania (well) under 30 per cent 
of the electorate turned up at the polls. To be sure, not all older member states have 
been marked by a decline in turnout in recent decades, yet a general downward trend 
can be observed in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.  
 Low turnout figures do not inherently imply success for PRR parties, but the 
general feeling that there is less at stake in European elections has been argued to 
stimulate a larger vote for smaller parties and a loss for governing parties.5 In national 
elections, voters may be inclined to vote strategically for larger parties, with an eye on 
the process of government formation afterwards. If a small party stands little chance to 
enter government, why waste your vote on it? On the other hand, EP elections – which 
do not lead to the formation of a government – are considered to matter less and voters 
are more likely to vote for a smaller party which represents their opinions more 
accurately. In addition, the outcome of European elections may reflect the 
disappointment of voters with national governments, which are often in the middle of 
their term and reached a low in terms of their popularity.    
 Campaigns for EP elections are further prone to be dominated by national political 
issues, with opposition parties placing emphasis on the unpopular measures implemented 
by the national government. Partly due to the complex nature of the European Union’s 
decision-making process – and arguably the little effort of established parties to politicise 
the issue of European integration – campaigns for European elections generally lack an 
informed and accurate debate about the course of European integration, or about 
concrete policies related to European-wide issues. That said, in view of the European-
wide economic crisis, the Eurozone bailouts, and the controversial calls for deeper 
integration to solve the Eurocrisis, there are reasons to suspect that the next EP elections 
will be more about the future of ‘Europe’ than ever before. Considering trends in public 
opinion, and aided by the second order character of EP elections, radical Eurosceptic 
parties seem to stand a good chance in May.  
 
Demand side: Euroscepticism among European populations 
                                                          
4 See the European Parliament website: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-
2009%29.html. 
5 K. Reif and H. Schmitt (1980), op. cit., ref. 2. 
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The Eurocrisis and the related deprivation experienced in many European countries is 
widely believed to have stimulated Eurosceptic sentiments. In economically troubled 
South European countries – the most obvious example being Greece – the EU and 
representatives of richer members states – not in the last place Germany – have been 
blamed for the harsh austerity measures imposed. Many citizens in more prosperous 
North European countries, meanwhile, have shown little support for spending tax money 
on saving fiscally irresponsible countries. One needs to be cautious, however, in 
assuming that the crisis has truly spurred a wave of anti-European sentiments amongst 
European publics. Based on her research findings, Catherine de Vries argued that public 
opinion towards Europe is ambivalent rather than hostile and that there is a growing 
uncertainty about, instead of opposition against, the scope and depth of European 
integration.6        
 Still, Eurobarometer survey data suggests that, since the crisis broke out, 
attitudes towards European integration have soured at least in a number of countries. 
Developments in respondents’ evaluations of the EU membership of their country are an 
indication of this.7 There have always been large differences between countries regarding 
the question of whether EU membership is perceived as a good or a bad thing, but in 
recent years people in certain traditionally ‘Europhile’ countries have appeared to turn 
more pessimistic. Most strikingly, while across the whole period between 2000 and 2011 
on average only 12.5 per cent of the Greeks had felt negatively about EU membership, 
this percentage rose to 33 per cent in 2011. In Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain the 
percentage of respondents considering their country’s EU membership a ‘bad thing’ has 
also increased dramatically in recent years. It is probably no coincidence that these were 
all countries that suffered badly since the beginning of the ‘Great Recession’ in 2008. The 
Standard Eurobarometer of Autumn 2013 also shows a general downward trend as far as 
the image of the EU is concerned.8 In the first half of 2006, 50 per cent of the European 
respondents still had a positive image of the EU; by Autumn 2013, the figure had shrunk 
to 31 per cent. At the same time, the percentage of respondents with a negative image 
of the EU grew from 15 in 2006 to 28 in 2013.  
It is important to note that these figures indicate that, even in the most 
Eurosceptic countries, people with an outright negative opinion about the EU or their 
country’s EU membership are still in the minority. Therefore, it would be erroneous to 
assume that the people of Europe have completely turned their backs on the EU. A 
                                                          
6 C. de Vries (2013) ‘Ambivalent Europeans? Public Support for European Integration in East and 
West’, Government and Opposition, 48 (3), 434-461. 
7 Eurobarometer’s interactive search system is used to calculate average figures over the 
(available) years between 2000 and 2011 (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm). If the question was asked in multiple surveys 
in a given year, the average figure for individual years was calculated first. 
8 European Commission (2013) ‘Standard Eurobarometer 80 / Autumn 2013’, first results, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_first_en.pdf, p.6. 
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negative trend in public opinion is nevertheless visible, also where more general levels of 
trust are concerned; the Autumn 2013 Eurobarometer suggests that trust levels in the 
EU have declined from 50 per cent in 2004 to 31 per cent in 2013.9 Notably, the survey 
results also show a similar trend for trust in national political institutions; the report 
reveals even lower trust percentages for national parliaments and governments. Hence, 
declining trust in the EU may actually signify a more general mood of discontent. If this 
observation is accurate, it provides even more reason to assume that the upcoming 
European Parliament elections present populist radical right parties with a great 
opportunity. 
 
Supply side: the anti-EU position of the populist radical right 
Anti-EU sentiments have also found their way to the institutional level, and Eurosceptic 
positions in national party systems have arguably become more common.10 Opposition to 
‘Europe’ is still most visible among the parties on the fringes of the ideological spectrum. 
As Paul Taggart has argued, parties on the periphery of party systems – largely 
irrespective of their ideological nature – have used Euroscepticism as an ‘ideological 
crowbar’ to differentiate themselves from the political mainstream.11 Yet radical parties 
also have substantive reasons to be sceptical or even hostile towards European 
integration.12 Radical left parties, for instance, have the tendency to portray European 
integration as a neo-liberal project encouraging a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of welfare 
entitlements and working conditions. Anti-EU attitudes are also very compatible with the 
ideological core of the PRR which, following Cas Mudde, consists of three main 
components: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.13 Particularly the first and third 
components are important in understanding the PRR’s opposition to European 
integration.  
 Nativism can be defined as ‘an ideology, which holds that states should be 
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native 
elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-
state’.14 Characterised by their nativist nature, PRR parties are natural opponents of the 
process of European integration, as this process is generally associated with a loss of 
national identity and sovereignty, as well as rising levels of immigration. ‘Brussels’ is 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p.5.  
10 See P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak (2013) ‘Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, Government 
Participation and Party Positions on Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 17-37. 
11 P. Taggart (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European 
Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33(3), p. 382. 
12 See L. Hooghe, G. Marks, and C. Wilson (2002). ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on 
European Integration?’, Comparative Political Studies, 35(8), 965-989; C. de Vries and E. Edwards 
(2009) ‘Taking Europe To Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism’, Party Politics, 
15(1), 5-28. 
13 C. Mudde (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
14 Ibid., p.22. 
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frequently portrayed as a foreign and undemocratic ‘superstate’ that threatens the native 
community; an argument which also relates to the populist element in the PRR ideology. 
The EU is perceived as an elitist organisation and the EU’s complex and opaque form of 
representative politics is something which populist (radical right) parties tend to 
oppose.15  
In light of these premises, a rise in anti-EU sentiments among European publics 
may contribute to a more favourable opportunity structure for PRR parties, who present 
themselves as the defenders of the nation state and the most credible opponents of 
supranational elitist organisations. Furthermore, voters may be more sensitive to PRR 
party arguments that the national political elite is responsible for surrendering power to 
unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. The economic situation may also blow wind in the sails 
of PRR parties, even if it has been previously argued that these parties’ main focus is on 
cultural rather than socio-economic issues.16 Consistent with their nativist ideology, PRR 
parties tend to subscribe to economic protectionism and forms of ‘welfare chauvinism’ – 
the idea that welfare entitlements should be reserved for the native population. In times 
of crisis (and bailouts to ailing fellow Eurozone members), campaigning with a message 
of ‘economic nationalism’ may indeed yield positive electoral results.  
 It is important to note that, despite certain shared core features, the PRR is a 
rather heterogeneous party family. Whereas, for instance, in West European countries 
PRR parties’ nativism is primarily expressed by an anti-immigration attitude, immigration 
hardly plays a role in the political debate of post-communist countries. Here, the PRR 
tends to target ethnic minority groups, with the Roma population coming across as a 
particular target for discrimination in the rhetoric of these parties.17 
 Even within Western Europe, on the one hand, and post-communist Europe, on 
the other, we can observe ideological differences. Although the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP), for instance, has clearly developed a tougher line on immigration issues over the 
years, it does not share the harsh anti-Islam rhetoric of Geert Wilders, the leader of the 
Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV). UKIP has actually aimed to 
distance itself from parties such as the PVV and the Front National Front (Front National, 
FN), two parties which have formed an alliance in the run up to the EP elections. UKIP 
instead built up loose ties with the Finnish True Finns (Perussuomalaiset, PS), a party 
with a less explicit anti-immigration stance, whose leader Timo Soini has repeatedly 
given speeches at UKIP conferences. From another angle, the religious fundamentalism 
and the similar take on the issue of ‘Gypsy criminality’ shared by PRR organisations in 
                                                          
15 P. Taggart (2004) ‘Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe’, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 9(3), 269-288. 
16 C. Mudde (2007), op. cit., ref. 12. 
17 A.L.P. Pirro (2013) ‘Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The Different 
Context and Issues of the Prophets of the Patria’, Government and Opposition, Firstview, 
doi:10.1017/gov.2013.32. 
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Central and Eastern Europe would at least hint at the possibility of transnational 
cooperation. Such collaboration is, however, not borne out in practice precisely due to 
the historical legacies at play in post-communist countries. For instance, the irredentist 
claims of the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Jobbik) 
are clearly at odds with the nativism of the Slovak National Party (Slovenská Národná 
Strana, SNS); in turn, the SNS played a crucial role in toughening the provisions of the 
Language Law in 2009, which came across as a hard thrust at the rights of the Hungarian 
minority living in Slovakia. Hence, nativism is in essence a radical exclusionary ideology 
which only contemplates the good of the nation (as framed by the PRR). 
 The differences between PRR parties are often substantial and should not be 
ignored. Still, irrespective of the ideological idiosyncrasies within this party family, PRR 
parties have, generally speaking, grown relatively united in their opposition to further 
European integration. Even though some older PRR parties have sympathised with the 
idea of European integration in the past, most of them took a clear Eurosceptic position 
in the last decades.18 What is more, the effects of the financial and economic crises and 
the perception that European publics have turned against Europe may provide incentives 
for PRR parties to harden their opposition to ‘Europe’ and to place this issue higher on 
their political agendas.19 A good example is the Party for Freedom of Geert Wilders, who, 
quite suddenly, placed ‘Europe’ at the centre of his campaign for the Dutch parliamentary 
election of 2012. Wilders had always been critical of the EU, but now for the first time 
favoured a Dutch withdrawal from the EU, and frequently referred to crisis related 
themes (such as the Eurozone bailouts) in order to motivate his shift from Euroscepticism 
to all-out Eurorejection. A similar course of action was undertaken by the Northern 
League (Lega Nord, LN) in Italy. Long-term ally of Silvio Berlusconi and his pro-European 
People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PdL), the LN concealed the most heated aspects 
of its Euroscepticism for the good of this electoral partnership. With the collapse of the 
PdL and the leadership change within the LN, the new party secretary Matteo Salvini has 
defined the euro currency as a ‘crime against humanity’20 and swiftly started cooperation 
talks with the Dutch PVV and the French FN for the upcoming European elections. 
 With EU accession portrayed as a sine qua non for the successful transformation 
of post-communist countries, Euroscepticism has hardly figured as a vote-seeking 
strategy in Central and Eastern Europe. Until recently, opposition to the EU was loosely 
formulated in terms of a loss of national sovereignty, often remaining at the margins of 
                                                          
18 C. Mudde (2007), op. cit., ref. 12, p. 164. 
19 A.L.P. Pirro and S. van Kessel (2013) ‘Pushing towards exit: Euro-rejection as a ‘populist 
common denominator’?’, paper presented at the EUDO Dissemination Conference, Florence, 28-29 
November 2013. 
20 ‘Salvini, primo discorso da leader della Lega «L’euro è un crimine contro l’umanità»’, Corriere 
della Sera, available from: 
http://milano.corriere.it/milano/notizie/cronaca/13_dicembre_15/salvini-primo-discorso-leader-
lega-l-euro-crimine-contro-l-umanita-73aa2104-658b-11e3-95f1-73e6b5fcc151.shtml, accessed 13 
January 2014. 
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the agenda of PRR parties. Despite their persistent Eurosceptic stance, PRR parties also 
seemed to abide by their countries’ membership in the EU (e.g. Ataka in Bulgaria) and 
were even part of ruling coalitions that adopted the euro currency (SNS in Slovakia). The 
setting has changed in the past few years. Mainstream parties such as Smer-SD (Smer – 
Sociálna Demokracia) in Slovakia or Fidesz (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség) in 
Hungary have progressively co-opted portions of the nativist agenda of the PRR, 
ascertaining a radicalisation of the mainstream.21 As a result, challenges coming from 
national party competitions and opportunities offered by the crisis may have prompted 
PRR parties to expand their palette of issues and focus more strongly on Europe. In this 
regard, the radicalisation of the anti-EU stances of the SNS and Jobbik since 2012 are 
exemplary. 
If parties of the PRR have indeed become more engaged with the issue of 
European integration in national election campaigns, this is likely to show even more 
clearly in the campaign for the European Parliament elections in May, where the issue of 
European integration can be expected to play a larger role than in national election 
campaigns.   
 
Towards a success for the populist radical right, and beyond   
In this article we argued that there are three interlinked reasons to assume that populist 
radical right parties will fare well in the upcoming European elections. Firstly, EP elections 
can be seen as ‘second order’ elections which are conducive to the electoral success of 
peripheral anti-establishment parties. Secondly, due to the salience of questions related 
to the financial and economic crises, the future of Europe is bound to become an 
important theme in the campaign, and opinion polls indicate that, at least in certain 
countries, many European citizens have become more wary of the EU and their country’s 
membership. Populist radical right parties, finally, are natural interpreters of the 
Eurosceptic or Euroreject message and are therefore in a good position to satisfy the 
demand of voters sceptical or hostile towards European integration. In many countries 
PRR parties have managed to build up a (fairly) respectable image and for them the 
European Parliament elections provide an excellent opportunity to gain exposure and 
improve their electoral performance.  
The European crisis has provided PRR parties with more ammunition against the 
EU. This is particularly the case in Eurozone countries, where the crisis is directly linked 
to unpopular measures adopted by national governments. PRR parties in creditor 
countries, for instance, have railed against bailouts for fiscally irresponsible countries in 
trouble and against plans to hand over more sovereignty to the European level in 
                                                          
21 See, for example, M. Minkenberg (2013) ‘From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in 
Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream’, Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies, 21 (1), 5-24. 
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response to the Eurocrisis. In economically ailing countries, meanwhile, the crisis has 
also provided opportunities for anti-EU forces, which blame EU actors and European 
leaders for imposing harsh austerity measures. Examples such as the Alternative for 
Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement 
(Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S) in Italy and the radical left Syriza in Greece show that 
Eurosceptic organisations do not necessarily belong to PRR milieus. Another important 
caveat is that PRR party performance is a matter of supply as much as demand; in crisis-
struck countries Portugal and Spain, for instance, no PRR party has thus far successfully 
mobilised on the basis of crisis-related themes.  
Despite an overwhelming number of alarmist accounts, the impact of the likely 
success of PRR parties will not automatically translate into policies detrimental to the 
EU.22 Moreover, if PRR parties across Europe are indeed successful in May 2014, this is 
not necessarily a predictor for their performance in future ‘first order’ national elections. 
At the same time, even if European integration turns into a central theme in the run up 
to the EP elections, it is far from certain that it will also be in future campaigns for 
national elections. Should matters related to the Eurocrisis become less prominent in the 
public debate, it is questionable whether ‘Europe’ will remain a salient political theme. 
Even though research has indicated that, under certain conditions, attitudes towards 
European integration may influence voting behaviour, and that Eurosceptic sentiments 
may encourage a vote for the PRR in particular,23 it remains to be seen whether PRR 
parties could ever win national elections exclusively on the basis of a Eurosceptic or 
Euroreject platform. 
                                                          
22 See M. Morris (2013) Conflicted Politicians. The Populist Radical Right in the European 
Parliament, London: Counterpoint. Available from: www.counterpoint.uk.com/reports-
pamphlets/conflicted-politicians 
23 See C. de Vries (2007) ‘Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale? How European Integration Affects 
National Elections’, European Union Politics, 8(3), 363-385; H. Werts, P. Scheepers and M. Lubbers 
(2012) ‘Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, 
socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right’, 
European Union Politics, 14(2), 183-205.  
